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The Performance of Short-term Institutional Trades 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Using a database of daily institutional trades, we document that a majority of short-term 
institutional trades lose money. In aggregate, over 23% of round-trip trades are held for less than 
three months, and the returns on these trades average -3.91% (non-annualized). These losses are 
pervasive across all types of stocks, with the lowest returns occurring in small stocks, value stocks, 
and low-momentum stocks. Short-term trades lose more in more volatile markets. Across funds, 
the worst short-term returns accrue to funds that do the most trading, and there is no evidence of 
persistent skill or disposition effect in short-term institutional trades.  
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I. Introduction 
 This paper documents the surprising finding that the shorter the holding period of an 
institutional trade, the more negative the return of the trade. We use data on the daily trades of 
institutions (money managers and pension funds) provided by a vendor hired to examine the 
trading costs of their clients. Mutual funds and defined-benefit asset managers have strong 
incentives to earn positive returns. The fact that they hire a vendor to analyze trade execution 
costs itself suggests that they care about returns. More broadly, Ma, Tang, and Gomez (2015) 
show that mutual fund managers have performance-based compensation contracts. Furthermore, 
empirical studies argue that stocks held by institutions are more efficiently priced (Boehmer and 
Kelley (2009), better governed (Chung and Zhang (2011), Ferreira and Matos (2008)), and have 
lower agency costs (Wang and Nanda (2011)) than stocks held by retail investors, suggesting that 
institutional traders make informed trades. Yet their short-term trades do not earn positive returns 
on average. This paper is the first to document this surprising fact and explore possible 
explanations for this finding.  
In contrast to the literature arguing or implying that institutional trades earn a positive 
return, our finding is consistent with a growing literature that classifies institutions as either 
“short-term” or “long-term” and finds temporary price distortions when short-term investors 
dominate trading. For example, Bushee and Noe (2000) show that when a firm's short-term 
(transient) institutional ownership percentage increases, stock return volatility also increases. 
Cella, Ellul, and Giannetti (2013) find that short-term institutions create price pressure during 
episodes of market-wide shocks, driving prices temporarily below the prices of stocks held more 
heavily by long-term investors. Cremers, Pareek, and Sautner (2014) find that the presence of 
short-term investors is associated with temporary price distortions and return anomalies. Cremers 
and Pareek (2015) find that among funds with high active share portfolios, only those with long 
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stock holding periods outperform their benchmarks. Taken together, this literature suggests that 
short-term institutional trades are detrimental to stock pricing. However, none of these studies 
examine the actual daily trades of institutions. Instead they rely on quarterly 13F data to develop 
statistics that characterize portfolios as short-term or long-term. The use of 13F filings for 
portfolio holdings does not fully reveal the actual holding period of an institution, since firms’ 
intra-quarter round trip trades do not show up in 13F filings.  
In a closely related paper, Puckett and Yan (2011) examine trades that take place entirely 
within a calendar quarter, which is a more limited definition of short-term trades than the set of 
all short-term trades used in this paper. About 54% of the under-three-month trades in our sample 
occur within a calendar quarter, but only about 36% of these trades match the intra-quarter trades 
of Puckett and Yan (2011) because of their narrower definition (see Section II. C). Puckett and 
Yan show that trades that are initiated and closed (or marked to market) entirely within a quarter 
produce positive returns, a finding which we replicate in our sample. But portfolio managers 
know that trades within a quarter will not be disclosed on 13F filings and may strategically 
conduct those trades within a quarter to hide them from competitors. Therefore, round-trip trades 
that take place entirely within a calendar quarter could very well be different from round-trip 
trades of the same length that straddle calendar quarters. We suggest that to characterize the 
returns from short-term trades requires a broader definition of round-trip trades that includes the 
history of all short-term trades, including those that span days in two calendar quarters. To the 
best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to examine the trading horizons of institutions using 
this broader definition. 
 In this study we examine short-term institutional trades using the entire record of buy and 
sell transactions in each stock to determine the length of time a fund holds a stock. In examining 
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actual trades rather than trades inferred from quarterly holdings, we are also testing the validity 
of the conclusions drawn from trades inferred from 13F filings, as discussed in detail in Section 
II. Our sample consists of the daily U.S. equity transactions of 1186 institutional money managers 
and pension funds that are present in a proprietary database for at least five years. A key 
advantage is that this database allows us to observe funds’ actual buy and sell transactions on a 
daily basis, rather than relying on proxies such as quarterly changes in holdings. We match stock 
purchases and sales within each fund to identify the holding periods and returns of over 105 
million round-trip trades between 1999 and 2009, with a total volume of over 291 billion shares. 
We find a surprising incidence of short-duration trades: Over 99% of the institutional funds 
execute round-trip trades lasting less than three months, and in aggregate over 23% of the volume 
occurs in trades that are held for less than three months.  
The prevalence of short-duration trades appears surprising in light of the generally low 
annual turnover rates reported for mutual funds and pension funds, typically averaging below 
100%. But a turnover rate of 100% could arise from a fund trading all of its positions once a year, 
or trading half of its positions twice a year and not trading the other half of its positions, or a wide 
array of other combinations of short- and long-duration trades. Clearly, the greater the dispersion 
of trade durations that make up a turnover rate, the less informative is the turnover rate about 
trade durations.1 Our dataset of round-trip trades at the fund level provides an inside examination 
of the trade durations behind fund turnover numbers. 
                                                            
1 The Investment Management Association (2011) points out that both the SEC and its European equivalent explicitly state that 
a fund’s turnover rate is meant only to give investors a sense of how portfolio turnover and resulting transaction costs affect fund 
performance, not to give an indication of trade holding periods. 
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We first examine the round-trip trades by holding period in aggregate for the entire sample. 
Short-duration trades have negative returns both in general and after adjusting for the performance 
of characteristic-based benchmarks as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) (DGTW 
hereafter). For example, trades held less than three months have an average raw (non-annualized) 
return of -3.91%, which remains a highly significant -1.24% after DGTW adjustment.2 The losses 
occur across all types of stocks, although losses are larger for smaller stocks, value stocks, low-
momentum stocks, and during times of high market volatility.   
We next examine the performance of short-duration trades at the fund level, where trading 
decisions are made. The mean and median fund-level returns for short-duration trades are 
significantly negative. For example, the mean (median) two-to-three-month trade returns for 
money managers is -2.64% (-2.94%), and for pension funds is -3.37% (-3.41%), both of which 
remain highly significant and negative after DGTW adjustment. Furthermore, we find that funds 
with the most short-duration trading, and funds with the most trading overall, tend to have the most 
negative short-duration trade returns. We find no evidence of skill in short-term trading: Funds 
that have the highest short-term trade performance in one period do not exhibit superior short-term 
trade performance in subsequent periods.  
Finally, we briefly explore why fund managers engage in so much unprofitable short-term 
trading. One possible explanation is that fund managers unwind loss-making trades early because 
they receive new information suggesting that the trades will be even more unprofitable if held for 
longer. We find no evidence that managers are successfully “cutting their losses”; in fact, we find 
that on average their short-duration trades would have been profitable had they been held for a 
                                                            
2 These are principal-weighted average returns for trades held less than three months, of which 6% are held for less than one 
week, 25% are held for one week to one month, 35% are held for one to two months, and 34% are held for two to three months.  
     
  5 
year instead of being closed out within three months. This pattern of realizing losses quickly 
although holding a trade longer would have been more profitable is consistent with a form of 
recency bias (Tversky and Kahneman (1973)), in which people overweight recent experiences (in 
this case, a recent adverse price move). We find no evidence of fund managers exhibiting a 
disposition effect: Their short-duration trades have negative returns and their longer-duration 
trades have positive returns on average. While some funds do earn positive returns on their short-
duration trades in each period, we find no evidence of persistent skill. Furthermore, funds with the 
highest short-duration trade returns in one period do not do more short-duration trades in 
subsequent periods, ruling out attribution-bias-based overconfidence as an explanation.   
Our fund-level findings are consistent with fund managers “trading to look active,” as 
modeled in Dow and Gorton (1997). Mutual fund and pension fund portfolio managers are closely 
monitored by either mutual fund advisors or pension fund clients and usually have performance-
based contracts (Ma et al. (2015)). Dow and Gorton predict that fund managers who have no 
information-based reason to trade will nonetheless trade actively if whoever is monitoring them is 
unable to distinguish between actively doing nothing and simply doing nothing. Since trading to 
look active is not based on information, such trades are likely to be unprofitable.  
These findings make several contributions to the literature. First, our results demonstrate 
the surprising finding that most institutional trades with holding periods of nine months or less 
lose money. This finding is new to the literature and emerges directly from our broad identification 
of round-trip trades. Overall, our results are consistent with the findings from the “short-term 
institutions” literature which documents that these institutions are not trading on superior 
information.  
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Second, our results contribute to other streams in the literature. Corporate finance studies 
routinely use the percentage of common stock held by institutions as a proxy for the sophistication 
of the investors holding the security. Our results suggest that the short-term trades of institutions 
are broadly inconsistent with these views and more in line with agency conflicts and behavioral 
biases. Thus, our evidence supports the use of “long-term investors” (or “dedicated investors” in 
the terminology of Bushee (2001)) to establish the effects of sophisticated institutional investors 
rather than treating all institutions as homogeneous. 
 Third, the literature on delegated portfolio management offers substantial evidence that 
not all institutional investment decisions are based on information and return-maximization. 
Mutual funds appear to select stocks based on familiarity (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz (1999)), sell 
stocks based on the disposition effect (Frazzini (2005)), and earn risk-adjusted returns lower than 
simple passive strategies (Fama and French (2010)).3 For pension funds, the available evidence 
paints a similar picture (e.g., Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2010)). Finally, Cremers and Pareek (2015) 
develop a measure of fund duration and show that “active share” results are driven by funds that 
hold stocks for two years or more. None of these studies use daily trade records and all base their 
conclusions on inferences from quarterly holdings. While we show that short-duration institutional 
trades are broadly inconsistent with decisions made based on information, we reject the disposition 
effect and attribution-bias-based overconfidence. Our results are consistent with recency bias, 
previously found only for retail investors (Nofsinger and Varma (2013)), and the agency cost of 
“trading to look active” by Dow and Gorton (1997). 
                                                            
3 A recent exception to the generally negative assessment of fund managers is provided by Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), who 
find evidence that mutual fund manager skill exists and is persistent. 
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II. describes our data and 
sample and details our methodology for identifying round-trip trades. Section III. presents returns 
for trades held over different periods. In Section IV. we examine which short-terms trades tend to 
lose money, and in Section V. we examine possible explanations. Section VI. discusses robustness 
checks, and Section VII. concludes. An Online Appendix (available at www.jfqa.org) provides 
technical details related to the matching of Ancerno data to CRSP, identifying round-trip trades 
using different methodologies, comparisons to the Puckett and Yan (2011) round-trip trade 
methodology, and the double-clustered standard errors used throughout this paper.  
II. Data, Methodology, and Sample 
We obtain institutional trading data from Ancerno Ltd., a widely recognized consulting 
firm that monitors trade execution costs for institutional clients. In order to provide execution cost 
analysis, Ancerno collects detailed transaction information for all equity transactions executed by 
each client. Ancerno’s clients include pension funds (such as CALPERS, the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, and the YMCA retirement fund) and money managers (such as Massachusetts Financial 
Services, Putnam Investments, Lazard Asset Management, and Fidelity).4 We also collect stock 
data from CRSP and Compustat.  
A. The Necessity of Identifying Round-Trip Trades 
  Our study tests an important implication of the “short-term” institution literature (Bushee 
and Noe (2000), Cella et al. (2013), Cremers and Pareek (2015)), that short-term institutions cause 
price distortions. A common statistic used in these studies to classify an institution as short-term 
or long-term is the “churn rate” developed by Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005). The churn rate 
for an institution is a measure of how frequently it rotates its position in all its stocks; this number 
                                                            
4 Previous academic studies that use Ancerno data include Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener (2009) and Puckett and Yan 
(2011). Puckett and Yan (2011) estimate that Ancerno clients represent approximately 10% of all institutional trading volume.  
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falls in the interval [0,2]. If dollar volume of trading is zero, the churn rate is 0; if every stock is 
sold and replaced by another stock at the end of the quarter, the churn rate is 2. Studies employing 
the churn rate use holdings reported quarterly and consequently ignore round-trip trading within 
the quarter and the timing of large trades relative to the stocks held. A simple example of how the 
churn rate can be misleading is illustrated in Exhibit 1 below:  
 
 In this example, the “quarterly churn rate” applies the formula to the shares and prices 
based on the beginning and end of the quarter, ignoring the intra-quarter trading revealed at day 
45 (as in Gaspar et al. (2005) and subsequent studies). The “45-day churn rate” applies the formula 
to the shares and prices between the beginning of the quarter and day 45 (halfway through the 
quarter), and separately to the period from day 45 through the end of the quarter, to provide a more 
detailed view of each portfolio’s trading. The prices never change so the different churn rates are 
driven only by trading. The quarterly churn rate for the buy-and-hold portfolio (on the left) is 
almost twice as large as the actively traded portfolio (on the right), but it is entirely driven by one 
The formula from Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) for the churn rate for fund i at date t is:
where Nj,i,t is the number of shares held of stock j  by fund i  at date t  and Pj,t is the price of stock j  at date t.
Stock Shares Price Shares Price Shares Price Shares Price Shares Price Shares Price
A 20,000 22 40,000 22 40,000 22 2,000 22 4,000 22 2,000 22
B 1,000 41 1,000 41 1,000 41 1,000 41 500 41 1,500 41
C 1,700 32 1,700 32 1,700 32 1,700 32 2,400 32 1,000 32
D 0 27 0 27 0 27 0 27 750 27 0 27
45-day Churn Rates: 0.582 0.000 45-day Churn Rates: 0.621 0.875
Quarterly Churn Rate: 0.582 Quarterly Churn Rate: 0.310
Quarter EndQuarter Begin Day 45 Quarter End Quarter Begin Day 45
EXHIBIT 1
Example of Misleading Churn Rates
Buy-and-Hold Portfolio Actively Traded Portfolio
ܥܴ݅,ݐ ൌ
∑ |݆ܰ ,݅,ݐ ݆ܲ ,ݐ െ ݆ܰ ,݅,ݐെ1݆ܲ ,ݐെ1 െ ݆ܰ ,݅,ݐെ1∆݆ܲ ,ݐ |݆∈ܳ
∑ ݆ܰ ,݅,ݐ ݆ܲ ,ݐ ൅ ݆ܰ ,݅,ݐെ1݆ܲ ,ݐെ12݆∈ܳ
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large trade in stock A. The buy-and-hold portfolio has constant holdings in stocks B, C, and D and 
clearly does not fit the “short-term” definition described by the literature examining short-term 
institutions. The actively traded portfolio, on the other hand, is obviously more short-term, yet it 
has a much lower churn rate. The lower churn rate occurs because the actively traded portfolio 
reverts to close to its beginning-of-quarter holdings at the end of the quarter. If it reverted to exactly 
the same holdings its churn rate would be zero. Of course, large price changes can offset the 
differences between the two portfolios, but in this example the price of stock A would have to fall 
by more than 50% to equalize the two churn rates.  
 This simple example demonstrates how a statistic derived from quarterly filings to infer 
portfolio holding periods may not reflect the actual holding period of an institution. Even a widely 
accepted statistic like the churn rate can be misleading since intra-quarter trades can offset short-
term trades, driving the churn rate down, yet such intra-quarter trades still signal the short-term 
focus of an institution. In addition, trading volume in a small number of stocks can easily bias this 
measure. We note that the use of churn rates may be clearly powerful for some classes of 
investment decisions such as the large responses by institutions to market-wide volatility (Cella et 
al. (2013)), since quarterly holdings are likely to be dramatically affected in the same direction for 
all institutions. If most prices in the market move in the same direction and most institutions that 
trade do so in roughly the same direction, then the churn rate will capture differences between 
institutions. For normal market periods, the churn rate is a noisy proxy for holding periods and an 
examination of actual holding periods is warranted.  
B. Identifying Round-Trip Trades 
To identify round-trip trade holding periods, we match buy and sell transactions for the 
same stock within the same fund. We use both the first-in-first-out (FIFO) and last-in-first-out 
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(LIFO) methods since there is no consensus on which method should be used to match buy and 
sell transactions into round-trip trades. On one hand, a consultant to institutional fund managers 
told us that “the clock starts when you enter the trade,” implying the FIFO approach may be more 
appropriate. On the other hand, LIFO may more accurately capture the change in opinion or 
information that causes a manager to switch from buying to selling or vice versa. In most of our 
analyses, the FIFO and LIFO trade matching methodologies yield identical inferences, so we 
present only results based on the FIFO methodology; where the results differ materially we present 
and discuss both.  
From the 2010 Ancerno database, we obtain the following information for each transaction: 
the ticker symbol of the security (symbol), the transaction date (tradedate), the identifier for the 
institution (clientcode), such as Fidelity or Putnam, the identifier for the fund within an institution 
(clientmgrcode), such as Fidelity Magellan or Fidelity Equity Income fund, the transaction 
direction (side, which is 1 for buy and -1 for sell transactions), volume of shares transacted 
(volume), and transaction price (price). All clientcodes and clientmgrcodes are expressed as 
numbers, so although we can identify all the transactions executed by the same institution or the 
same fund, we cannot determine the identity of the institution or fund. For each symbol-clientcode-
clientmgrcode combination, we use data from January 1997 to December 2009 to identify round-
trip trades. A round-trip trade for a stock is defined as a purchase and a sale of the same number 
of shares in the same fund (identified by clientcode-clientmgrcode).  
It is worth mentioning that the composition of the Ancerno database has changed since the 
version that we use. These changes include name changes for some variables and revelation of the 
identities of funds. It is important to our research design that the funds know their trades will be 
kept confidential and that there is a clean match between fund and fund family. It appears that 
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Ancerno has complicated this match in subsequent database releases. The database we use is 
similar to the one used in Hu, McLean, Pontiff, and Wang (2014), who also discuss these changes. 
To identify the FIFO-based (LIFO-based) round-trip trades, we assemble the transaction 
information for each symbol-clientcode-clientmgrcode combination chronologically into a queue, 
and when a transaction in the opposite direction enters the queue, we match it with the earliest 
(most recent) existing transaction in the queue. The number of trading days between the buy 
transaction and the sell transaction is the holding period of the round-trip trade, and the number of 
shares bought and sold (which are equal under the definition of a round-trip trade) is the round-
trip trade quantity. We provide examples of our FIFO and LIFO trade matching procedures in the 
Online Appendix (available at www.jfqa.org). 
We note that the Ancerno dataset has no information on a fund’s holdings at any time; only 
transactions are reported to Ancerno. Our method effectively initializes each symbol-clientcode-
clientmgrcode combination with zero shares, and we discard the first two years of the dataset 
because Ancerno coverage is sparse (as in Anand, Irvine, Puckett, and Venkataraman (2013) and 
Goldstein et al.  (2009)). All of our analyses are based on round-trip trades from the sample period 
January 1999 to December 2009.  
We apply the following filters to remove potentially misleading or erroneous trades. We 
discard all trades with clientcode equal to zero, which indicates that Ancerno cannot reliably track 
the fund over time. We also discard trades with buy price or sell price less than one cent. To ensure 
that the number of shares traded and the trade prices are comparable between the buy and sell 
dates, we exclude round-trip trades in which the buy and sell dates straddle a stock split date, e.g., 
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the stock was bought before a split date and sold after the split date.5 Approximately 6% of the 
FIFO round-trip trades (5% of the LIFO round-trip trades) are eliminated from our sample by this 
screen; fewer LIFO trades are eliminated because they tend to be shorter and span fewer of the 
stock split dates. Finally, we exclude intraday trades (in which a fund buys and sells the same stock 
on the same day) because intraday timestamps in Ancerno are incomplete (e.g., Anand et al. 
(2013)).  
C. Differences from Puckett and Yan (2011) Methodology  
To assemble our sample, we form a queue of all buys and sells a fund makes in a stock 
from the beginning of the Ancerno database and match the buys with sells using either the FIFO 
or LIFO rule to determine trade holding periods and returns. In contrast, Puckett and Yan (2011) 
examine all buys and sells within a stock-quarter and identify intra-quarter round-trip trades if the 
same fund has both buys and sells for a stock within a quarter, calculating returns using a weighted 
average price, FIFO, or LIFO. The Puckett and Yan method effectively starts with a clean slate at 
the beginning of each calendar, while our method considers how a fund’s trading before a quarter 
affects the interpretation of trading within the quarter. As a result, the two methodologies can give 
rise to starkly different identification of short-term trades that occur within a calendar quarter, and 
                                                            
5 From CRSP, we identify 4800 stock splits and stock dividends (CRSP DISTCD = 5523, 5533, 5543) involving 2795 stocks in 
our sample. (See online appendix for details of matching Ancerno data to CRSP, available at www.jfqa.org.) We note that the 
inclusion of dividend distributions in this filtering treatment is a conservative approach. If managers typically keep the shares 
they receive as a stock dividend, retaining trades straddling dividend dates will affect the quantity in the calculation of round-trip 
trades; however, if managers automatically convert dividend distributions into cash, stock dividends would be immaterial to our 
round-trip trade calculations. Since we cannot identify which action specific managers adopt with respect to stock dividends, we 
discard all round-trip trades straddling stock dividend distributions as well as stock splits. 
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the round-trip trades identified under different methods are not subsets of each other.6 Examples 
of how the two methodologies can give rise to different and non-overlapping trade categorizations 
are provided in the Online Appendix (available at www.jfqa.org).  
We believe that using the entire pattern of trading best represents the round-trip trades for 
the purpose of investigating questions raised in the literature about the information content of 
short-term institutional trades. To determine whether the average institutional portfolio manager 
is skilled and/or informed it is necessary to look jointly at all his trading decisions and the times at 
which these decisions are made.  
D. Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample of FIFO round-trip trades and for 
the subsample of trades made by funds that are present in the Ancerno universe for at least five 
years.7 A natural concern when analyzing trade holding periods is whether the incidence of short-
duration trades is unduly influenced by the presence of funds that remain in the universe for only 
a short period of time. For example, we obviously cannot observe round-trip trades longer than 
one year for a fund that is in the universe for only one year. Of the 4053 unique funds appearing 
                                                            
6 The key difference between Puckett and Yan’s analysis and ours is that we are interested in trade holding periods, while Puckett 
and Yan are specifically interested in intra-quarter trading. This distinction leads to different trade classifications in our study 
versus theirs. For example, a trade initiated on January 15 and closed out on March 15 the same year would be considered an 
interim round-trip trade by Puckett and Yan (2011), but a trade initiated on March 15 and closed out on May 15 the same year 
would not; both trades would be categorized as two-month trades in our study. Conversely, a trade initiated on March 15 and 
closed out on September 15 the same year would be marked to market on March 31 in Puckett and Yan’s interim trading 
performance measure; in our study, the trade would be categorized as a six-month trade and would not be marked to market on 
March 31. 
7 Table 1 for LIFO round-trip trades is virtually identical and available on request.  
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in the universe between 1999 and 2009, 1059 funds are present for one year or less, and 1186 funds 
are present for five or more years. In Table 1 we present descriptive statistics for both the full 
sample of 4053 funds and the subsample of 1186 funds that are present for at least five years, 
which are the focus of our study; in the remainder of the paper we present results only for the 
sample of funds present for at least five years.   
[Table 1 here] 
Panel A of Table 1 shows that the 4053 funds in the full sample belong to 772 distinct 
institutions; the subsample of 1186 funds present for five or more years belong to 324 distinct 
institutions. In both samples the median institution has three funds. In the full sample, there are 
over 328 billion shares and over $10 trillion in round-trip trades.8 Although only 29% of the funds 
in Ancerno are present for five or more years (1186 of the 4053 funds), they account for about 
88% of the share volume and dollar volume in the full sample. These long-lived funds also trade 
over 96% of the stocks traded in the full sample. In both the full sample and the subsample of 
funds present five or more years, the majority of the funds are pension funds, but the majority of 
trading is done by money managers. For example, among the funds present five or more years, 
money managers represent only seven percent of the funds but account for over 93% of the share 
volume traded. We analyze money managers and pension funds separately because their 
differences may lead to different inference (e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992)).  
                                                            
8 We note that the number of round-trip trades, also reported in the table for completeness, may not be as informative for estimating 
liquidity as the volume statistics, both because the average size of equity trades falls considerably during the sample period 
(Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2011)) and because in some cases our identification of round-trip trades counts orders that 
are executed in multiple pieces as separate trades. Hvidkjaer (2008) provides evidence that institutions increasingly engage in 
order splitting strategies resulting in more small trades originating from large institutional investors. 
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Panel B of Table 1 shows that the trades in both the full sample and the subsample of funds 
present for five or more years are heavily weighted towards large-capitalization stocks. Over 80% 
of the share volume in each sample occurs in stocks in the two largest market-capitalization deciles, 
while less than half a percent of the share volume occurs in the two smallest deciles. This pattern 
of institutional trading volume being concentrated in large-cap stocks is consistent with the 
literature on institutional holdings. For example, Lewellen (2011) finds that between 1980 and 
2007, large-cap stocks (above the NYSE 80th percentile) account for over 80% of institutional 
holdings, while micro-cap stocks (below the NYSE 20th percentile) constitute about one percent 
of total institutional holdings.  
Table 2 presents the breakdown of institutional round-trip trades by holding period, from 
less than one week to four or more years. Panel A shows the breakdown for round-trip trades 
identified using the FIFO method, and Panel B shows analogous breakdowns using the LIFO 
method. The columns labeled “Aggregate Shares” in each panel report holding-period share 
percentages calculated across all trades in each sample. A significant portion of trades are held for 
short holding periods. For example, using the FIFO method (Panel A), over seven percent of share 
volume occurs in trades with round-trip durations of less than one month and over 23% of share 
volume occurs in round-trip trades lasting less than three months (see Aggregate Shares, 
Cumulative % column). Using the LIFO method to identify round-trip trades results in even more 
short-duration trades, mainly for the mechanical reason that the LIFO method matches a 
transaction to its most recent preceding opposite-side transaction, rather than the longest-ago 
opposite-side transaction under FIFO. Panel B shows that using the LIFO method, over 27% of 
share volume occurs in trades held less than one month and over 48% in trades held less than three 
months (Aggregate Shares, Cumulative % column).  
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[Table 2 here] 
Further insight is provided by the cross-sectional fund-level statistics in the last four 
columns of Table 2, which report the mean and median across the individual funds’ cumulative 
percentages. While the mean and median fund-level cumulative percentages are broadly in line 
with the aggregate cumulative percentages, money managers on average do more short-duration 
trades than pension funds, and the shortest-duration trades are more concentrated in a smaller 
number of funds. For example, Panel B shows that in aggregate 11.83% of share volume occurs in 
LIFO trades held less than one week (Panel B, Aggregate shares, Cumulative %), but the average 
money manager and pension funds, respectively, have only 6.86% and 1.98% of their share volume 
in trades held less than one week.9 Because we are interested in the behavior of individual fund 
managers, our subsequent analyses will examine fund-level behavior as well as the aggregate 
sample of trades.  
Figure 1 provides further insight into the prevalence of short-duration trades at the fund 
level. The incidence of short-duration trades is not driven by only a few extremely active funds: 
Of the 1186 funds that are present for five or more years, only 43 funds engage in no round-trip 
trades lasting less than one month based on the FIFO method of identifying round-trip trades (top 
graph). Of the other 1143 funds, trades lasting less than one month account for 1-3% of trading 
volume in 477 funds, 3-6% of trading in 343 funds, 6-10% of trading in 180 funds, and over 10% 
of trading in the remaining 143 funds. The remaining graphs in Figure 1 depict the analogous fund 
frequency distributions for trades defined under the LIFO method and for trade holding periods of 
less than three months.  
                                                            
9 Note that the aggregate share measures simply sum across all shares traded, irrespective of the funds in which they occur, so 
they are not equal to a weighted average of the mean for money managers and the mean for pension funds.  
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[Figure 1 here] 
III. Holding Period Returns  
The key finding of the studies that use churn rates is that short-term trading is not 
necessarily based on economic fundamentals of the stocks. If short-term trades are based on 
economic fundamentals (or successfully anticipating flows from other traders), the trades should 
result in positive returns on average. Table 3 presents average raw returns (Panel A) and DGTW-
adjusted returns (Panel B) for round-trip trades by their holding periods; trade returns are weighted 
by principal amount (initial share price times number of shares) within each holding period 
category. The raw return is the percentage price change in the stock. The DGTW-adjusted return 
is raw return of each stock minus the DGTW benchmark return, where the DGTW benchmarks 
are the value-weighted returns to portfolios of stocks sorted into quintiles by size, book to market, 
and past returns, yielding 125 portfolios.10 The returns calculated here should be viewed as the 
upper limit on a trade’s true profit because they are based on transaction prices, which include the 
cost of the bid-ask spread but exclude explicit transaction costs such as commissions. The column 
labeled “Aggregate Trade Returns” reports average raw and DGTW-adjusted returns across all 
trades in each holding period. We also calculate the raw and DGTW-adjusted returns for the trades 
of each fund in each holding period category and present the mean and median fund returns for 
trades in each duration bucket. The last eight columns of each panel (labeled “Fund-level Trade 
Returns”) examine the dispersion of trade returns across funds, separately for money managers 
and pension funds. 
[Table 3 here] 
                                                            
10 Details of DGTW benchmark are available on Russ Wermer’s Web site http://alex2.umd.edu/wermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/ 
coverpage.htm. We thank Zhi Da for providing the daily equivalents of the DGTW benchmark returns for our sample. 
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Our first question is whether the prevalence of short-duration institutional trades indicates 
that institutional fund managers are primarily exploiting short-lived information advantages 
(which could be either fundamental or flow-based). The aggregate trade returns column in Table 
3, Panel A, shows that the average raw return is significantly negative for trades held less than two 
years and significantly positive for trades held longer than two years.11 Adjusting returns with the 
DGTW-based benchmarks (Panel B) also indicates that short-duration trades have significantly 
negative returns, although here the aggregate returns become significantly positive earlier (at the 
six- to nine-month holding period). The fund-level trade return columns echo the conclusions 
drawn from aggregate returns. The mean and median returns across the short-duration trades of 
funds are mostly significantly negative for horizons less than a year. In short, Table 3 does not 
support the hypothesis that short-term trading reflects short-lived information advantages.   
These results contrast sharply with Puckett and Yan (2011), who find positive returns for 
intra-quarter trades (see their Table 2) and for buys and sells that are marked to market at the end 
of the quarter (see their Table 3). As we explain in Section II C, Puckett and Yan’s trades are not 
a subset of ours because of the influence of the queue, but there is certainly a substantial overlap. 
In work available from the authors, we use the Puckett and Yan method of constructing round-trip 
trades and contrast it with intra-quarter trades as defined by looking at the entire queue (our main 
method). Focusing on Puckett and Yan’s 1999-2005 sample period, we find that their method 
produces a 3.26% mean return in our sample, of similar magnitude to the 2.99% reported in Table 
2 of Puckett and Yan (2011). The correlation of the median returns between our FIFO and Puckett 
                                                            
11 The aggregate return of -3.91% quoted in the abstract is calculated by principal-weighting the returns from the first four holding-
period categories: 6% of the under-three-month trades are held for one day to one week, 25% are held for one week to one month, 
35% are held for one to two months, and 34% are held for two to three months.  
     
  19
and Yan’s is 67%. We would not expect to exactly match their returns because we focus on funds 
present for five or more years and exclude stocks that split. Using the full information in the queue 
of buys and sells, our intra-quarter round-trip trades average -1.94% for FIFO and -0.24% for LIFO 
over the same 1999-2005 period, with both averages significantly different from zero. Thus the 
general conclusion of Puckett and Yan (2011) that managers have informed trades that are hidden 
from 13F filings (i.e., within calendar quarters) is supported. What is not valid is a broader 
conclusion that institutional short-term trading produces positive returns on average.12 
Our results are consistent with recent evidence on fund returns. Using bootstrap methods, 
Kosowski, Timmerman, Wermers, and White (2006) conclude that there is statistically significant 
evidence of information advantages for only a small group of mutual funds, while Fama and French 
(2010) conclude there is no such evidence. For managers of funds with institutional clients such 
as pension funds, Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2010) conclude that there is only weak evidence of 
informational advantages. At a minimum, it appears that information advantages are rare enough 
that they are unlikely to explain the majority of short-term trades.  
IV. Which Short-term Trades Lose Money?  
A natural question is whether the loss-making short-term trades have certain characteristics 
in common. For example, are the losses concentrated in a certain type of stocks or during 
particularly volatile markets, or do they occur mostly in funds that do a lot of trading? To shed 
some light on these questions, we perform portfolio sorts on stock and fund characteristics. Our 
sorting variables include stock beta (from CRSP), size (market capitalization from CRSP), 
                                                            
12 Puckett and Yan (2011) are careful to conclude that their findings apply only to their definitions of intra-quarter round-trip 
trades. Other papers are not as careful. For example Griffin, Shu, and Topaloglu (2012) state on page 28 “Puckett and Yan (2011) 
find that short-term institutional trading earns abnormal returns”.  
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illiquidity (using the illiquidity measure from Amihud (2002)), book-to-market ratio (from CRSP 
and Compustat), momentum (calculated using a 12-month lookback window, as in Asness, 
Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013)), and market volatility (calculated as monthly volatility of S&P 
500 index). At the fund level, we sort on the average annual percentage of dollar volume that is in 
trades held less than three months, the average annual dollar volume of all round-trip trades, and 
the average size of trades held less than three months. The latter two sorts are proxies for fund size, 
which we cannot measure directly because our dataset contains no information on fund holdings; 
the Ancerno database contains transactions only. Quintile rankings are determined annually across 
all stocks or funds with short-term trades in that year. Table 4 presents the DGTW-adjusted return 
results of the sorts at the stock level (Panel A) and the fund level (Panel B).   
[Table 4 here] 
Looking first at Panel A, the sorts on stock characteristics show that the poor performance 
of short-term trades occurs in most stock categories. Returns are lowest in the smallest stocks (Size 
quintile 1), where information asymmetry is likely to be greatest. Returns are also lower for stocks 
in the highest book-to-market quintile, i.e., value stocks (Book/Market quintile 5), which is not 
surprising given the consistent finding that value portfolios earn higher returns over horizons of 
two to three years (e.g., Asness et al. (2013)). Our finding that short-duration trades of stocks in 
the lowest momentum quintile have very negative DGTW returns (-6.25%) is consistent with prior 
research. The stocks in Q1 are exactly the stocks that should be sold short, but these institutional 
trades are long. It is worth noting that the stocks in Q5 are the stocks typically bought in momentum 
portfolios. Q5 shows the largest positive number in the table and is roughly the magnitude found 
in momentum studies (e.g., Asness et al. (2013)). Short-duration trade returns are also significantly 
lower during times of high market volatility, which may reflect both the higher implicit cost of 
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trading during volatile times and a higher likelihood of managers closing out positions for 
behavioral reasons during volatile times. Returns on short-term trades do not appear to vary 
monotonically with stock betas or stock illiquidity.   
Panel B of Table 4 analyzes money manager and pension funds separately, as they may 
have different horizons and motivations. Among pension funds, funds that have the highest 
percentage of short-term trades tend to have the lowest short-term trade returns. Thus the 
percentage of short-duration trades across funds seems to be inversely correlated with expertise in 
short-term trading. Funds with the largest amount of trading per year and largest average trade 
sizes, two proxies for fund size, also tend to have the lowest returns on short-term trades, 
suggesting that bigger funds do not exhibit more skill (and even exhibit significantly less skill) at 
short-term trading. The differences across money manager funds are generally not significant, 
perhaps because there are only 84 money manager funds in our sample, limiting our ability to 
detect statistically significant differences across fund quintiles.  
Overall, the picture that emerges is that the poor returns on short-duration institutional 
trades are not confined to a particular subset of stocks or type of funds. Nonetheless, some funds 
do earn positive returns on short-duration trades (e.g., in Table 3 the 75th percentile is positive in 
almost all short-term holding periods), which could be due to trading skill not correlated with the 
dimensions captured in Table 4 or simply luck. To examine the extent to which fund manager skill 
can explain the fund-level results, we next examine the persistence of funds’ short-duration trade 
performance.  
[Table 5 here] 
Table 5 presents the results of tests for return persistence for short-duration trades at the 
fund level. In each semiannual period we sort funds into quintiles based on their performance for 
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trades held less than three months. Note that the returns reported are for a particular category of 
trades within each fund, not for the fund’s overall performance.13 We report the average DGTW-
adjusted return for funds in each quintile in the base semiannual period (when the funds are 
assigned to quintiles) and in the four subsequent semiannual periods. For example, Panel B shows 
that the best-performing quintile of pension funds in short-term trades earned an average of 14.17% 
in the base period (Panel B, Base period column, Q5 row), while the worst-performing quintile of 
funds earned an average of -18.81% (Panel B, Base period column, Q1 row). The difference of 
32.98% between the best and worst-performing quintiles is statistically significant, with a t-
statistic of 17.0. Statistical significance in all of our tests is based on standard errors that are 
double-clustered on fund and semiannual period (see Online Appendix for details, available at 
www.jfqa.org). Although the differences are smaller in subsequent semiannual periods, they are 
statistically significant. However, the performance difference between Q1 and Q5 is driven mainly 
by the significant underperformance of the funds in Q1 in all periods subsequent to portfolio 
formation. Those pension funds with the least skill in trades held less than three months continue 
to exhibit poor returns in the subsequent four semiannual periods, a pattern that is repeated for 
money managers (Panel A) but with reduced magnitudes.14 In summary, the return persistence 
results do not appear to be driven by information advantages even for those funds that earn the 
highest returns.  
                                                            
13 Because we do not have information about a fund’s holdings, only its transactions, we cannot calculate a fund’s overall 
performance.  
14 The weaker significance for money managers may in part reflect the small number of money managers in the sample: 84 money 
managers versus 1102 pension funds. 
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V. Why Do Short-term Trades Lose Money?  
In this section we investigate several possible explanations for the widespread low returns 
on short-duration trades, in an attempt to understand why fund managers engage in trades that 
appear to persistently lead to losses. These include the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman 
(1985)), loss-cutting, recency bias (Tversky and Kahneman (1973)), overconfidence (Gervais and 
Odean (2001)), and trading to look active (Dow and Gorton (1997)). While many of these 
behavioral biases have been documented for individual investors, Frazzini (2005) finds evidence 
that mutual fund managers are also subject to the disposition effect, suggesting that fund managers 
may suffer from behavioral biases as well.  
A. Disposition Effect 
The disposition effect predicts that fund managers sell winners and hold on to losers, which 
would result in higher returns for shorter-duration trades and lower (or negative) returns on longer-
duration trades. The pattern of returns by trade holding period in Table 3 reveals no evidence of 
the disposition effect, as managers do not appear to sell winners and hold onto losers, at least if we 
assume that the purchase price is the reference price. But our results are consistent with Ben-David 
and Hirshleifer’s (2012) finding that, contrary to the standard predictions of the disposition effect, 
at short holding periods individual investors are more likely to sell stocks with big losses than 
those with small losses. 
B. Loss-cutting 
One plausible explanation for negative returns on short-term trades is that fund managers 
unwind loss-making trades early because they receive new information suggesting that the trades 
will be even more unprofitable over the longer term, so they “cut their losses.” To examine this 
possibility, in Table 5 we perform the following simulation. For each trade that is held for less 
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than three months, we calculate what its return would have been if it had been held for the rest of 
a full year (where average fund-level returns turn positive in Table 3). For example, if a trade was 
initiated on March 15, 2006, and closed out on April 1, 2006, we calculate its hypothetical “what-
if” return if it had been held from April 1, 2006 to March 15, 2007.  
[Table 6 here] 
The results in Panel A of Table 6 show that in aggregate and at the fund level, the mean 
and median trades that were actually held less than three months would have produced a positive 
raw return had they been held for the remainder of a year. A similar picture emerges in Panel B, 
where the DGTW-adjusted returns for the what-if trades are generally positive or near zero. This 
suggests that the negative returns earned on short-duration trades are not explained by fund 
managers cutting their losses in light of new information received shortly after they initiate trades.  
C. Recency Bias 
The combination of negative short-term returns followed by higher returns if the trades had 
been held longer is consistent with managers demonstrating recency bias. Recency bias is the 
heuristic in which a person evaluates the probability of events by the ease with which relevant 
instances come to mind. It creates a tendency to overemphasize recent events, for example a recent 
return of large magnitude, and has been found to impact stock selection for retail investors 
(Nofsinger and Varma (2013), Shefrin (2007)). Using the heuristic, when a manager observes a 
sharp fall in stock price shortly after buying a stock, he tends to overreact and close out the position, 
or in practitioner vernacular “abandon his thesis,” leading to a short-duration trade at a loss (as in 
Table 3), although the position would have produced a positive return if it had been held longer 
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(as shown by the what-if trade returns in Table 5).15 Ideally a test for recency bias would examine 
a fund’s entire holdings to determine whether funds are more likely to close out trades after 
observing adverse price moves; unfortunately, the Ancerno dataset contains only funds’ 
transactions, not their entire holdings, so such an analysis is not possible in our sample. However, 
the pattern of returns in Table 4 is consistent with recency bias. Institutions appear to be selling 
value stocks too soon and going long stocks that are typically shorted in momentum portfolios. 
This suggests an opportunity for further research using both portfolio holdings and trade horizons. 
V.D. Overconfidence 
To explicitly test for overconfidence, we examine the link between returns and subsequent 
short-duration trading activity. When combined with attribution bias, overconfidence predicts that 
following a period of high realized returns, investors mistakenly attribute the returns to their own 
skill and as a consequence tend to trade more in subsequent periods. The reverse should occur for 
low returns.  
In Table 7 we sort funds into quintiles based on their short-duration trade returns in the 
base period (as in Table 5), and we report the average percentage of short-duration trading (rather 
than the trade returns) in the base period and each subsequent period. In most cases the amount of 
short-duration trading is not higher in subsequent periods for funds with the highest base-period 
returns (Quintile 5) than for funds with the lowest base-period returns (Quintile 1). Comparing Q5 
and Q1, we find that for both money managers and pension funds, the difference in short-duration 
                                                            
15 Reconstructing the “what-if” returns of Table 5 by including the initial holding period in the one-year returns, that is, by 
beginning the simulated returns from the initiation date of the trade, produces returns that are (not surprisingly) very close to 
adding the negative returns of Table 3 to the positive returns of Table 5.  
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trading is statistically insignificant for most periods subsequent to portfolio formation.16 Indeed, 
the few significant differences show more short-term trading for funds with the lowest short-term 
trade returns, the opposite of what would be expected from overconfident managers who 
mistakenly attribute performance to their skill. Overall, the picture that emerges suggests that 
whatever overconfidence fund managers may be exhibiting is not directly related to attribution 
bias.17  
[Table 7 here] 
E. Trading To Look Active 
Trading simply to show that a portfolio manager is active, as modeled by Dow and Gorton 
(1997), should lead to more short-duration trades with low returns, as they are undertaken to justify 
their management fees rather than to maximize returns. At a minimum such trades would be 
expected to lose the bid-ask spread, but given their lack of information, they may also lose a great 
deal more, for example if they inadvertently trade against better-informed investors. Our findings 
of widespread losses in short-term trades are consistent with fund managers trading simply to look 
active. That pension funds have lower mean and median fund returns on short-duration trades than 
money managers suggests that trading to look active may be a larger problem for pension funds, 
                                                            
16 Statistical significance in all of our tests is based on standard errors that are double-clustered on fund and semiannual period 
(see online appendix for details, available at www.jfqa.org). 
17 Other aspects of overconfidence are still possible. For example, Moore and Healy (2008) define three dimensions of 
overconfidence: (1) overestimation is the biased estimation of the chance of success; (2) overprecision is the excessive certainty 
about the accuracy of one’s beliefs; and (3) overplacement is when people believe they are better than others. Our results suggest 
that overestimation and overprecision based on previous returns do not occur in these trades, but overplacement is still a 
possibility. 
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perhaps because the nature of their contracts encourages them to trade more actively just to show 
they are doing something (Lakonishok et al. (1992)).  
In summary, the losses on short-term trades appear most consistent with managers trading 
to look active or suffering from recency bias, which causes them to overweight recent adverse 
price moves in their trading decisions. We find no evidence of the disposition effect, loss-cutting, 
or attribution-bias-related overconfidence.   
VI. Robustness Checks  
Results for the full sample of funds in the Ancerno universe (4053 funds) are qualitatively 
similar to those presented in the paper (which are based on the 1186 funds present for five or more 
years), with the exception that the full sample implies that a larger proportion of trades are short-
duration, a mechanical result because funds that are present for only a short period of time can 
contribute only short-duration trades. All of our findings are qualitatively similar when we use one 
month instead of three months as the cutoff for our definition of short-duration trades. Results are 
not driven by the financial crisis of 2008; all results are qualitatively similar when 2008 is dropped 
from the sample period. Alternative measures of market-wide volatility including the VIX index 
and range-based measures of S&P 500 index volatility yield qualitatively similar results. Using 
the Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka (2014) measure of illiquidity suggests that short-term trades in the 
most illiquid stocks have significantly lower returns. A multivariate regression of short-duration 
(DGTW-adjusted) trade returns on stock and fund characteristics provides similar inferences to 
those provided by the univariate tests in Table 4. As an alternative to DGTW adjustments, we also 
replicate our analyses with market-adjusted returns, defined as raw returns minus returns on the 
S&P 500 index over the identical holding period for each trade. All of our conclusions hold. 
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We also investigate whether cross-trading (internalization) among funds of the same 
institution may explain our results. Chaudhuri, Ivkovic, and Trzcinka (2014) find evidence that 
institutions cross-trade in order to benefit one fund at the expense of another, behavior about which 
the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor has expressed 
serious concern (U.S. Department of Labor (1998)). We identify potential cross-trades when the 
same stock is bought by one fund and sold by another fund belonging to the same institution, at 
the same price on the same day. Potential cross-trades account for less than 0.001% of the total 
share volume in our sample, and excluding them from our analyses does not change our results.  
VII. Conclusion  
This is the first study to document that the majority of short-duration institutional trades 
lose money, using a large database of institutional trades. We examine a wide range of actual trade 
holding periods of institutional investors, from one-day trades to those held for multiple years, 
using the entire available history of an institution’s trading. Analyzing the daily U.S. equity trades 
of 1186 institutional funds present in the Ancerno database for at least five years, we identify 
holding periods and returns of over 105 million round-trip trades between 1999 and 2009, with a 
total volume of over 291 billion shares. We find that short-duration trades are common in 
institutional portfolios. In aggregate over 23% of volume occurs in trades that are held for less than 
three months. Within the less-than-three-month category are a significant number of trades that 
are held for less than a month and even less than a week. The prevalence of short-duration trades 
appears surprising in light of the typically low turnover rates for mutual funds and pension funds.  
The average returns for trades held for nine months or less are overwhelmingly negative, 
with the lowest returns occurring in small stocks, value stocks, and low-momentum stocks. Short-
duration trade returns are also lower when the market is more volatile. At the fund level, funds that 
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do the most short-duration trading also have the lowest short-duration trade returns, and we find 
no evidence of persistent skill in short-duration trades.  
The negative returns on short-duration trades do not appear to be due to loss-cutting when 
managers receive new information after initiating a trade, since the returns would have been 
positive on average if managers had held the positions for a year. That short-term trades have 
negative returns on average rules out the disposition effect. We show that the relatively few 
successful short-term trades do not lead to more short-term trading in the same fund, which rules 
out attribution-bias-based overconfidence. Short-duration trades may be driven by recency bias, 
with managers selling after a sharp adverse price move. In the practitioner vernacular, the manager 
“abandons his thesis” when the stock price goes against his trade. Our results are also consistent 
with the agency problem that arises when clients cannot distinguish when a manager is “actively 
doing nothing” versus “simply doing nothing.” By trading when they have no particular 
information, fund managers expose themselves to losses both from the bid-ask spread and from 
possible adverse selection if they trade with better-informed traders.  
This study presents a richer picture of institutional trading decisions, providing insight into 
the many findings in the literature that are based on characterizing institutions as short-term versus 
long-term. By looking at precise trades rather than net changes in quarterly portfolio holdings, we 
are able to reveal the true short-term trading activity of institutions, which can be masked by using 
“churn rates”. From this microfoundation, it is easier to understand why the presence of short-term 
institutions (defined as institutions who engage in more short-term trades) is found to be associated 
with temporary price distortions and return anomalies.  
Our results demonstrate that the conclusions based on statistics derived from 13F filings 
are generally supported by trading data. To be clear, we cannot identify the fund so we cannot 
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characterize a fund as “short-term” or “long-term” and directly link the statistics used by other 
authors to holding periods. But our finding that trades held up to nine months are not generally 
based on information is consistent with papers arguing that short-term institutional trades do not 
reflect fundamental information.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
Institutional trading data are from Ancerno Ltd. for trades executed between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 
2009. The table presents statistics for all FIFO round-trip trades in common stocks for the entire universe of pension 
and money manager funds reporting to Ancerno (Full Sample) and the subset of funds that are present in the Ancerno 
database for five or more years (Funds present 5 or more years).  Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the two 
samples, and Panel B presents the distribution of round-trip trades for each sample by stock market capitalization 
decile. Market capitalization deciles are determined from CRSP, based on the market capitalization of each stock at 
the end of the year prior to the initiation of the trade.   
          
Panel A. Funds, Institutions, and Round-trip Trades     
     Full Sample  
Funds Present 5 or More 
Years  
Number of funds    4,053  1,186  
    Pension funds    3,811  1,102  
    Money managers    242  84  
Number of 
institutions    772  324  
Median number of funds per institution 3  3  
Total share volume of round-trip trades (billion) 328.41  291.13  
    Pension funds    30.07  18.83  
    Money managers    298.34  272.30  
Total dollar volume of round-trip trades ($ trillion) 10.08  8.94  
    Pension funds    0.91  0.55  
    Money managers    9.17  8.39  
Total number of round-trip trades (million) 121.03  105.59  
    Pension funds    9.51  6.25  
    Money managers    111.52  99.33  
Total number of stocks traded  9,737  9,407  
          
          
Panel B. Distribution of Round-trip Trades by Stock Market Capitalization Decile  
   Full Sample  Funds Present 5 or More Years  
Decile  
% Share 
Volume 
% Dollar 
Volume % Trades  
% Share 
Volume 
% Dollar 
Volume % Trades 
D1 (Smallest)  0.03 0.02 0.04  0.03 0.01 0.03 
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D2  0.11 0.03 0.13  0.11 0.02 0.09 
D3  0.26 0.08 0.28  0.26 0.07 0.23 
D4  0.62 0.19 0.75  0.62 0.19 0.68 
D5  1.25 0.50 1.64  1.25 0.50 1.56 
D6  2.23 1.03 3.02  2.21 1.01 2.89 
D7  4.05 2.24 5.30  4.01 2.21 5.06 
D8  7.36 4.88 8.92  7.29 4.84 8.61 
D9  15.21 11.97 14.96  15.14 11.86 14.48 
D10 (Largest)  68.88 79.06 64.96  69.09 79.27 66.36 
  Total   100.00 100.00 100.00   100.00 100.00 100.00 
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TABLE 2 
Round-trip Trades by Holding Period 
           
Institutional trading data are from Ancerno Ltd. for trades executed between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 
2009 by funds in the database for five or more years. Panel A presents statistics based on round-trip trades 
defined using FIFO methodology; Panel B presents statistics based on round-trip trades defined using LIFO 
methodology. Holding period refers to the time between when a trade is initiated and when it is unwound. The  
columns labeled Aggregate Shares present percentages calculated across all round-trip trades in each category; 
the columns labeled Fund-level Cumulative Percentages present statistics about the cumulative percentages of 
share volume in trades with holding periods less than or equal to the period specified, across the funds in each 
sample.  
            
       Fund-level Cumulative Percentages (%) 
Holding Period  Aggregate Shares  Money Manager   Pension 
At least Less than  % 
Cumulative 
%  Mean Median  Mean Median 
           
Panel A. FIFO Round-trip Trades         
1 day 1 week  1.38 1.38  1.37 0.98  1.30 0.26 
1 week 1 month  5.80 7.18  7.23 6.05  5.18 3.42 
1 month 2 months  8.00 15.18  15.25 14.35  11.73 9.45 
2 months 3 months  7.87 23.06  23.13 23.11  18.48 16.09 
3 months 4 months  7.49 30.54  30.36 29.88  25.07 23.05 
4 months 5 months  6.82 37.37  36.92 36.75  31.12 29.81 
5 months 6 months  6.02 43.39  42.82 42.71  36.58 36.23 
6 months 9 months  14.80 58.18  57.15 58.39  50.57 52.25 
9 months 1 year  10.59 68.77  67.67 70.20  61.28 64.35 
1 year 2 years  19.77 88.54  88.93 90.61  84.30 88.99 
2 years 3 years  6.74 95.28  95.98 97.03  93.28 96.61 
3 years 4 years  2.64 97.92  98.40 99.18  97.09 99.23 
4 years   2.08 100.00  100.00 100.00  100.00 100.00 
           
Panel B. LIFO Round-trip Trades         
1 day 1 week  11.83 11.83  6.86 5.62  1.98 0.72 
1 week 1 month  16.06 27.90  20.16 18.24  8.42 6.23 
1 month 2 months  11.89 39.79  31.74 30.89  17.39 14.94 
2 months 3 months  8.42 48.20  40.63 41.18  25.52 23.67 
3 months 4 months  6.55 54.76  47.70 48.48  32.81 31.81 
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4 months 5 months  5.32 60.08  53.70 54.99  39.09 39.26 
5 months 6 months  4.39 64.47  58.53 60.84  44.61 45.18 
6 months 9 months  9.59 74.06  69.49 72.29  57.86 60.92 
9 months 1 year  6.45 80.50  77.26 79.59  67.51 71.75 
1 year 2 years  11.91 92.41  91.98 92.97  86.92 90.76 
2 years 3 years  4.21 96.62  96.78 97.28  94.20 96.90 
3 years 4 years  1.83 98.45  98.66 99.26  97.47 99.20 
4 years     1.55 100.00   100.00 100.00   100.00 100.00 
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TABLE 3 
Trade Returns by Holding Period 
 
Institutional trading data are from Ancerno Ltd. for trades executed between January 1, 1999, and December 
31, 2009 by funds in the database for five or more years. The table reports FIFO round-trip trade average 
returns that are weighted by principal amount (initial share price times number of shares) within each holding 
period category. Raw return (Panel A) is the percentage price change over the holding period; and DGTW-
adjusted return (Panel B) subtracts the DGTW benchmark return over the identical holding period from the raw 
return for each round-trip trade.  Means and medians in bold are significantly different from zero with a p-value 
less than 0.01; means and medians in italics are significantly different from zero with a p-value less than 0.05.  
              
    
Aggregate 
Trade 
Returns 
 Fund-level Trade Returns 
Holding 
Period   Money Managers  Pension Funds 
At 
least 
Less 
than   Mean Median 
25th 
P'tile 
75th 
P'tile  Mean Median 
25th 
P'tile 
75th 
P'tile 
               
Panel A. Raw Returns           
1 day 1 wk  -1.00  -0.82 -0.54 -1.51 0.36  -1.52 -0.54 -4.14 1.94 
1 wk 1 mo  -2.72  -2.06 -1.56 -3.81 -0.44  -3.14 -2.48 -7.46 1.29 
1 mo 2 mo  -3.99  -0.80 -2.36 -5.18 0.58  -3.07 -2.59 -7.65 2.15 
2 mo 3 mo  -5.22  -2.64 -2.94 -6.59 0.41  -3.37 -3.41 -8.82 2.13 
3 mo 4 mo  -4.88  -3.24 -3.37 -6.95 -0.27  -3.12 -2.82 -8.86 2.76 
4 mo 5 mo  -5.07  -2.85 -3.75 -6.56 0.13  -2.93 -2.85 -9.60 3.40 
5 mo 6 mo  -5.32  -2.87 -3.30 -7.50 0.13  -2.35 -2.37 -9.60 4.35 
6 mo 9 mo  -4.79  -1.89 -1.94 -7.51 1.69  -2.11 -1.48 -8.52 4.59 
9 mo 1 yr  -4.36  -2.10 -1.07 -7.89 3.20  -0.97 -0.56 -8.71 6.81 
1 yr 2 yr  -2.31  0.14 0.41 -6.66 7.53  1.27 1.79 -7.80 11.07 
2 yr 3 yr  1.46  3.66 5.36 -7.35 14.12  3.19 4.73 -9.63 18.42 
3 yr 4 yr  6.71  5.93 10.31 -6.62 24.23  4.06 6.87 -12.63 24.84 
4 yr   11.11  3.18 4.59 -13.92 22.10  6.76 10.03 -12.81 31.02 
              
Panel B. DGTW-adjusted Returns         
1 day 1 wk  -0.56  -0.57 -0.37 -1.90 0.28  -1.47 -0.51 -3.71 1.30 
1 wk 1 mo  -0.99  -1.40 -0.89 -3.46 0.02  -2.30 -1.56 -5.61 1.18 
1 mo 2 mo  -1.28  -1.21 -1.20 -4.44 0.22  -2.17 -1.79 -5.55 1.30 
2 mo 3 mo  -1.49  -0.74 -1.12 -4.95 0.36  -2.25 -2.35 -6.24 1.58 
3 mo 4 mo  -0.96  -1.07 -1.07 -4.94 1.04  -2.48 -2.47 -7.06 1.83 
4 mo 5 mo  -0.79  -0.98 -1.67 -3.85 0.71  -1.89 -2.22 -6.85 1.94 
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5 mo 6 mo  -0.73  -0.74 -0.61 -4.51 1.32  -1.69 -2.15 -6.96 2.69 
6 mo 9 mo  0.26  -0.31 -0.02 -4.35 1.83  -1.64 -1.25 -5.86 2.46 
9 mo 1 yr  1.19  -0.40 0.30 -4.76 2.74  0.10 0.00 -4.81 4.47 
1 yr 2 yr  2.88  2.24 2.66 -1.72 5.41  1.11 1.31 -4.25 5.93 
2 yr 3 yr  2.54  4.00 4.40 -4.82 10.12  3.62 3.22 -4.26 10.91 
3 yr 4 yr  3.65  4.67 6.31 -7.22 14.68  6.33 3.42 -9.60 16.43 
4 yr     7.78   8.79 6.62 -17.23 16.51   4.68 2.64 -13.26 16.47 
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TABLE 4 
Short-duration Trade Returns by Stock, Market, and Fund Characteristics 
 
Institutional trading data are from Ancerno Ltd. for trades executed between January 1, 1999, and 
December 31, 2009 by funds in the database for five or more years. Analysis is run separately for 
money manager funds and for pension funds, and short-term trades are defined as FIFO round-trip 
trades held for less than three months. In the first five columns of Panel A, short-term trades are sorted 
by stock characteristics, with quintile rankings determined annually across all stocks with short-term 
trades in that year.  In the last column of Panel A short-term trades are sorted into quintiles based on 
the volatility of the S&P 500 index in the month the trade is closed out. In Panel B, funds are sorted 
into quintiles based on their average annual percentage of short-term trades (first two columns), 
average annual dollar volume of round-trip trades (middle two columns), and average size of short-
term trades (last two columns). DGTW-adjusted average returns for each fund's short-term trades are 
weighted across trades by principal amount (initial share price times number of shares). Numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics, which are computed based on double-clustered standard errors in Panel A.  
             
Panel A. Sorts by Stock and Market Characteristics      
Quintile  Beta  Size  
Amihud 
Illiquidity  
Book/ 
Market  
Mo-
mentum  
Market 
Volatility 
Q1  0.02  -6.71  -1.45  0.26  -6.25  -0.53 
  (0.0)  (-3.5)  (-2.2)  (0.4)  (-3.6)  (-2.0) 
Q2  -1.08  -3.19  -0.28  -0.07  -1.89  -0.73 
  (-2.1)  (-3.9)  (-0.7)  (-0.2)  (-2.2)  (-1.2) 
Q3  -0.39  -1.26  -1.33  -1.46  -0.58  -1.45 
  (-1.4)  (-2.9)  (-4.0)  (-2.4)  (-1.9)  (-1.5) 
Q4  -1.71  -0.80  -2.47  -3.08  -0.17  -1.10 
  (-2.0)  (-1.5)  (-2.4)  (-4.4)  (-0.5)  (-1.3) 
Q5  -2.19  -1.15  -0.10  -7.06  0.87  -2.24 
  (-1.7)  (-1.8)  (-0.1)  (-3.3)  (1.1)  (-2.7) 
             
Q5-Q1  -2.21  5.56  1.35  -7.33  7.12  -1.71 
  (-1.1)  (3.6)  (2.3)  (-4.0)  (4.1)  (-2.0) 
             
             
Panel B. Sorts by Fund Characteristics       
  % Short-term Trades  Amount of Trading  Average Trade Size 
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Quintile  
Money 
Managers  
Pension 
Funds  
Money 
Managers  
Pension 
Funds  
Money 
Managers  
Pension 
Funds 
Q1  -1.18  -0.16  -0.29  -1.40  1.11  -1.07 
  (-1.7)  (-0.2)  (-0.2)  (-1.5)  (0.7)  (-1.6) 
Q2  0.65  -1.47  -0.27  -1.81  -0.78  -2.30 
  (0.4)  (-2.5)  (-0.3)  (-3.5)  (-1.5)  (-4.3) 
Q3  -1.77  -2.26  -1.35  -1.77  -2.11  -2.49 
  (-2.1)  (-4.9)  (-2.1)  (-3.6)  (-3.3)  (-5.3) 
Q4  -1.17  -2.89  -1.61  -2.32  -1.37  -1.81 
  (-3.7)  (-7.4)  (-4.9)  (-6.0)  (-2.6)  (-3.5) 
Q5  -1.38  -3.51  -1.28  -3.06  -1.57  -2.73 
  (-2.8)  (-7.9)  (-2.7)  (-8.9)  (-2.4)  (-4.8) 
             
Q5-Q1  -0.20  -3.36  -0.99  -1.66  -2.68  -1.66 
    (-0.2)   (-3.8)   (-0.6)   (-1.8)   (-1.6)   (-1.9) 
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TABLE 5 
Short-duration Trade Return Persistence at the Fund Level 
            
Institutional trading data are from Ancerno Ltd. for trades executed between January 1, 1999, and 
December 31, 2009 by funds in the database for five or more years. Analysis is run for separately for 
money manager funds and for pension funds. In each panel, funds are sorted into quintiles based on the 
average returns on their under-three-month FIFO round-trip trades in each semiannual period, and the 
average fund returns (in %) for each quintile are reported in the quintile formation period (Base period) and 
the subsequent four semiannual periods (Base+1, Base+2, Base+3, and Base+4). DGTW-adjusted average 
returns for each fund's under-three-month round-trip trades are weighted across trades by principal amount 
(initial share price times number of shares). Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, which are computed 
based on double-clustered standard errors.  
             
  Semiannual Periods  
Quintile  Base Period  Base +1  Base +2  Base +3  Base +4  
            
Panel A. Money Managers        
Q1  -15.96  -2.86  -3.74  -0.28  -1.65  
  (-10.3)  (-2.5)  (-2.2)  (-0.2)  (-0.9)  
Q2  -5.07  -1.65  -1.64  -1.84  -0.57  
  (-8.6)  (-2.4)  (-1.4)  (-2.8)  (-0.6)  
Q3  -1.58  -0.99  -1.13  -1.68  -0.97  
  (-4.4)  (-1.9)  (-2.4)  (-2.6)  (-1.9)  
Q4  1.56  -0.11  -0.86  -0.41  -1.09  
  (3.6)  (-0.3)  (-1.5)  (-0.7)  (-1.5)  
Q5  9.78  0.39  1.96  0.78  0.02  
  (11.6)  (0.3)  (2.1)  (0.8)  (0.0)  
            
Q5-Q1  25.74  3.25  5.70  1.06  1.68  
  (13.2)  (2.1)  (2.8)  (0.5)  (0.8)  
            
            
Panel B. Pension Funds         
Q1  -18.81  -4.99  -5.18  -5.02  -4.14  
  (-13.7)  (-6.9)  (-6.4)  (-5.5)  (-5.1)  
Q2  -6.11  -3.15  -3.44  -3.48  -3.52  
  (-10.9)  (-4.9)  (-5.4)  (-5.5)  (-5.7)  
Q3  -1.92  -3.06  -2.20  -2.39  -2.62  
  (-5.4)  (-5.6)  (-4.1)  (-4.2)  (-4.2)  
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Q4  1.64  -1.46  -1.41  -1.97  -2.05  
  (5.9)  (-3.2)  (-2.2)  (-3.2)  (-3.9)  
Q5  14.17  0.19  -1.03  -0.35  -0.38  
  (15.4)  (0.3)  (-1.5)  (-0.4)  (-0.5)  
            
Q5-Q1  32.98  5.18  4.14  4.67  3.76  
    (17.0)   (7.7)   (7.5)   (5.4)   (5.1)   
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TABLE 6 
Trade Returns by Holding Period if Trades Had Been Held for 1 Year Instead of Less than 3 Months 
              
Institutional trading data are from Ancerno Ltd. for trades executed between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2009 by funds in 
the database for five or more years. For each actual trade in the database that was held for less than three months under the FIFO 
method, we calculate the "what-if" one-year return as the return the trade would have earned if it had been held for the remainder of 
a full year instead of closed within three months (for example, the return that would have been earned if a one-week trade had been 
held for the subsequent 51 weeks). The table reports round-trip trade average "what-if" raw returns that are weighted by principal 
amount (initial share price times number of shares) within each holding period category. Raw return (Panel A) is the percentage 
price change over the holding period; DGTW-adjusted return (Panel B) subtracts the DGTW benchmark return over the identical 
holding period from the raw return for each round-trip trade. Means and medians in bold are significantly different from zero with a 
p-value less than 0.01; means and medians in italics are significantly different from zero with a p-value less than 0.05.  
               
Actual  Aggregate  
1-year "What-
if" Trade 
Returns 
 Fund-level 1-year "What-if" Trade Returns 
Holding Period   Money Managers  Pension Funds 
At least 
Less 
than   Mean Median 
25th 
P'tile 
75th 
P'tile  Mean Median 
25th 
P'tile 
75th 
P'tile 
              
Panel A.  Raw Returns on Trades Held Less than Three Months if They Had Been Held for One Year    
1 day 1 wk  35.11  16.18 12.94 2.79 24.26  8.81 3.89 -10.22 18.80 
1 wk 1 mo  33.76  33.29 11.55 6.01 23.60  16.34 6.65 -2.55 18.49 
1 mo 2 mo  61.86  39.64 21.56 7.09 45.14  16.56 4.69 -5.82 20.40 
2 mo 3 mo  37.30  19.13 8.96 1.38 24.01  22.51 4.06 -5.27 19.00 
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Panel B. DGTW-adjusted Returns on Trades Held Less than Three Months if They Had Been Held for One Year   
1 day 1 wk  0.01  -0.42 -0.07 -3.03 1.95  0.15 -0.05 -9.44 8.36 
1 wk 1 mo  0.70  0.05 0.45 -1.38 2.70  1.84 0.91 -3.86 6.11 
1 mo 2 mo  1.15  0.52 0.58 -1.26 3.08  1.53 1.21 -2.97 5.84 
2 mo 3 mo   3.39   1.59 0.78 -1.10 4.34   2.02 0.98 -2.82 5.60 
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TABLE 7 
Short-duration Trading Amount Following Returns 
            
Institutional trading data are from Ancerno Ltd. for trades executed between January 1, 1999, and 
December 31, 2009 by funds in the database for five or more years. Analysis is run separately for money 
manager funds and for pension funds. In each panel, funds are sorted into quintiles based on the average 
DGTW-adjusted  returns on under-three-month FIFO round-trip trades in each semiannual period, and the 
average percentages of share volume that occurs in short-duration trades (in %) for each quintile are 
reported in the quintile formation period (Base period) and the subsequent four semiannual periods 
(Base+1, Base+2, Base+3, and Base+4). Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, which are computed 
based on double-clustered standard errors.  
             
  Semiannual Periods  
Quintile  Base Period  Base +1  Base +2  Base +3  Base +4  
            
Panel A. Money Managers        
Q1  14.78  15.71  19.81  19.43  24.75  
  (5.2)  (4.1)  (6.3)  (4.6)  (3.5)  
Q2  17.00  18.77  20.24  23.28  23.99  
  (7.7)  (8.9)  (4.9)  (5.7)  (6.9)  
Q3  20.40  20.78  21.53  22.04  22.37  
  (8.7)  (6.3)  (6.9)  (6.0)  (5.4)  
Q4  22.03  20.69  19.35  18.15  19.47  
  (5.3)  (5.7)  (5.1)  (5.6)  (4.7)  
Q5  17.51  16.79  15.75  17.23  17.07  
  (8.0)  (6.4)  (5.5)  (4.7)  (6.2)  
            
Q5-Q1  2.72  1.08  -4.06  -2.20  -7.68  
  (1.5)  (0.5)  (-2.2)  (-1.1)  (-1.5)  
            
            
Panel B. Pension Funds         
Q1  16.33  18.45  19.61  19.86  20.49  
  (11.8)  (10.8)  (12.3)  (10.9)  (10.4)  
Q2  20.08  20.28  21.09  22.09  23.18  
  (14.4)  (12.8)  (13.1)  (13.3)  (12.0)  
Q3  21.90  20.59  20.86  21.45  22.03  
  (15.1)  (14.5)  (13.2)  (12.2)  (13.0)  
Q4  20.84  19.50  20.59  20.79  23.43  
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  (14.5)  (13.8)  (11.4)  (11.3)  (10.6)  
Q5  15.68  17.51  17.50  19.35  19.82  
  (9.3)  (11.1)  (9.8)  (8.8)  (9.8)  
            
Q5-Q1  -0.65  -0.94  -2.10  -0.51  -0.68  
    (-0.7)   (-1.1)   (-2.6)   (-0.4)   (-0.7)   
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FIGURE 1 
Proportion of Short-duration Trades by Fund 
       
Institutional trading data are from Ancerno Ltd. for trades executed between 
January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2009 by funds in the database for five or 
more years.  The first two graphs present the percentages of round-trip trading 
volume of each fund that occurs in trades held for less than one month under the 
FIFO and LIFO methods for identifying round-trip trades. For example, in the 
first graph the fifth bar shows that for 104 funds in the database, trades held less 
than one month account for between 10% and 20% of their total trading volume.  
The last two graphs present the percentages of round-trip trading volume for 
each fund that occurs in trades held for less than three months. 
       
Graph 1. FIFO Trades Held < One Month    
 
 
 
      
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
Graph 2. LIFO Trades Held < One Month    
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Graph 3. FIFO Trades Held < Three Months    
 
 
 
      
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
Graph 4. LIFO Trades Held < Three Months    
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